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I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, The Idaho Supreme Court "exercises
free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether
substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings." Jensen v. City of
Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 410, 18 P.3d 2 11 , 2 14 (2000). The Court's role on appeal of the
Commission's rulings is " not to re-weigh the evidence or consider whether it would have reached
a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Id.
Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." Id. Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of proof, but
less than a preponderance."

id. at 412, 18 P.3d at 216.

Additionally, the Commission's

conclusions on the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless such conclusions
are "clearly erroneous." Id. at 410, 18 P.3d at 214. Finally, the Commission's factual findings are
reviewed " in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147
Idaho 186, 190, 207 P .3d 162, 166 (2009).

It is the industrial Commission's province to decide the weight which should be given to
the facts presented and the resulting conclusions drawn from those facts. See Seamans v. Maaco
Auto Painting & Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747,918 P.2d 1192 (1996). The Commission's conclusions
on the weight and credibility of the evidence should not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous. See Wheaton v. Indus. Special lndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 538,928 P.2d 42 (1996).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - I

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of the Case

This case involves a claim brought by Steven Andrews, Appellant, against the State of
Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"). The questions submitted below for the
consideration of the Industrial Commission were:

1.

Whether or not Appellant was totally and permanently disabled; and

2.

If the Appellant was totally and permanently disabled, whether or not his industrial
accident has combined with preexisting medical conditions in order to establish ISIF
liability under the applicable statutory structure.

This appeal presents the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Industrial Commission's finding U1at the ISIF was not liable under the applicable statutory
structure.

B. Statement of Facts
A hearing on the matter was conducted before Referee Powers on June 16, 2015 in
Pocatello. The sole witness to provide live testimony was Appellant. R. I 06. Post hearing
depositions of Nancy Collins, Ph.D. and Hugh Selznick, M.D. were completed and considered as
evidence by Referee Powers. Id. Likewise, all exhibits offered by both Andrews and ISIF were
admitted at the hearing and considered by Referee Powers. Id.

i.

Testimony from Mr. Andrews

At the time of hearing Appellant was 57 years old. June 16, 2015, Hearing Transcript

(12:17), (13:8). He graduated from high school in 1977. Id. (14:12). At the time of hjs industrial
accident, Claimant was employed by the LOS Church. In the course of his employment with the

R ESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2

Church, Andrews provided plumbing, electrical, custodial, building maintenance, mechanic and
HVAC services. Id. (19:9; 20: 11).
At the time of the subject industrial accident, Andrews had been employed by the LOS
Church for 23 years whjle also engaging in outside businesses. Id. (57:6). Prior to engaging in
employment for the LDS Church, Andrews drove commercial truck, worked in landscaping,
surveyed pipe, worked as a grounds supervisor for State Hospital South, and worked in
maintenance. Id. (14:20; 15:6, 9, 24; 18:2,12,18; 55:19: 56:2).
The injury which gave rise to Appellant's claim was a back injury he sustained as a result
of a industrial accident. Claimant was instructed to avoid twisting, turning, crawling and ladders.
He was initially given a 10 pound lifting restriction. Id. (28: 12). Claimant carries a walking staff
because a cane causes his back to twist. id. (37:4). His lifting restriction was later raised to 25
pounds, however, he testified he can't lift above 5 or 6 pounds without pain. Id. (51:21; 52:13).
Claimant testified that, because of his back injury from the Church accident, he cannot sit without
pain, twist, stoop or bend over or reach. id. (61: 1-2, 6, 11 ).
Appellant was clear in testifying that it was his back injury which disqualified him from
work. Id. (62:7-16). At the time of the hearing, Appellant was taking Percocet on a daily basi s.
He had never taken Percocet prior to the industrial accident at issue. Id. (61: 16-20).
Prior to the injury which was at issue in thfa matter, Appellant testified he had " several" on
the job injuries to his back working for the LOS Church. Id. (21 :9-11). To the best of hi s
recollection his first low back surgery was "in the 90's." id. (25:2-5). After his back surgery in
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1991 he was limited to lifting of 70-80 pounds. However, after his second back surgery in 2007 he
was told he could not lift over 100 pounds. id. (60:7-15).
Appellant had left knee surgery prior to the industrial accident at issue in 2009. Id. (38: 13; 59: 11- L5). He testified that current problems with is left knee are due to arthritis. Id. (59: 19-21 ).
He did not attribute his difficulties with this knee to his most recent back surgery. Id. At the time
of hearing, Appellant had not been disqualified from any jobs due to left knee problems or
limitations. Id. (62:11-13).
Appellant has had multiple knee injuries and resulting surgeries on his right knee and it
was replaced in 2010 after this industrial accident at issue. Id. (58:1-20). The original injury to the
knee occurred in a motorcycle accident in 1977. Id. No restrictions were issued, at the time of
hearing, with respect to the right knee. He chose to replace the knee because he "was still on
Church insurance." Id. (58:8-21).
AppeJlant also had previous surgery on both shoulders. Id. (42:5-10). Prolonged overhead
lifting of his arms, would cause inflammation in his shoulders. Id. (45 :21-25; 46: 1-2). Andrews
also had issues with "Turf Toe," on his right foot, prior to the industrial accident at issue. Id.
(33: 19-25). Appellant testified that standing " is an issue" and he can stand unassi sted for 5 minutes
and walk about a quarter mile with assistance from a walking stick or a shopping cart. Id. (36: 1525; 37: 1-9). He also identified arthritis in his right foot. Id. (37: 15-16).
Prior to the industrial accident, Andrews testified that he has Type II diabetes and had high
blood pressure. Id. (44:21-25; 45:1-2). However, Claimant testified that the high blood pressure
resolved after he left his employment at State Hospital South. Id.
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ii.

Post-Hearing Deposition Testimony of Nancy Collins, Ph. D.

Nancy Collins, Ph. D. ("Dr. Collins") issued two vocational reports regarding Andrews.
The first in March of2011 and second in July of 20 13. See Claimant 's Exh. A, Report of Nancy J.
Collins. Dr. Collins testimony was preserved for the record through a post hearing deposition taken
on August 19, 2015 and has been made a part of this record on appeal.
As part of her vocational analysis Dr. Collins took note of various restrictions placed upon
Claimant. Specifically, the lifting restriction of 35 pounds alone, and 50 pounds in combination
with a co-worker. See Claimant's hearing Exh. A, p. 1. Dr. Collins a lso agreed the 35 pond lairing
restriction was greater than the limitation issued to him after his 2007 back surgery. Collins

Deposition (36:6-18).
Likewise, Sarah Fagan, P.A. provided a large list of restrictions which included, no sitting,
standing or walking for more than 1 to 3 hours each per day, no driving more than 1 to 3 hours per
day. Lifting restriction of no more than 10 pounds for 5 to 8 hours per day, 10 to 15 pounds 3 to 5

hours per day, 15 to 35 pounds I to 3 hours per day, and 50 pounds only with a co-worker. See
Claimant's Hearing Exh. A, p. 1. Simi larly, Ms . Fagan specified a permanent restriction ofl imiting
any bend , stoop, push/pull, twist, climb, squat, kneel, reach, grasp or repetitive movements to 1 to
3 hours per day, no balancing or crawling, and opined that claimant would require frequent changes
in position. Id. These limitations were noted in Dr. Collins report. Id.
Dr. Collins also opined that C laimant has subjective limitations. Specifically, she opined
that he has problems with stamina, sitting limitations of 30 minutes, standing limitations of 10
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minutes, difficulty walking, complaints of loss of sensation and pain, incontinence, impaired
dexterity and limited mobility. Id.
Dr. Collins also testified regarding the source of Claimant's limitations. Specifically, she
testified that, as a result of the industrial accident, whjch necessitated a bilateral hemi laminectomy
with nerve root decompression at L 3-4, Andrews was severely limited. Collins Deposition (38: 1925; 39-41; 42:1-13). Dr. Collins testified that due to this industrial accident alone, and Andrews's
non-ratable factors, no jobs were available to Appellant. Id.
111.

Post Hearing Deposition Testimony of Hugh S. Selznick, M.D.

Dr. Selznick was retained by Appellant to perform an independent medical exam. 1 Dr.
Selznick testified, "The main issues of play, just for the record or whoever reads this deposition
transcript, are the low back and right knee." Id. (34:7-9).
Dr. Selznick agreed with the limitations identified by Dr. Collins and Nancy Fagan.

Selznick Deposition (28: 11-25; 29: 1-11 ). Dr. Selznick further testified these limitations were
caused solely by the industrial accident. Id. (28:20-25; 29: 1-11 ).
Dr. Selznick also testified that, at the time of the industrial accident, Claimant was not
under any restrictions and was "grossly asymptomatic." Id. (25:4-13). He further testified that the
treatment received after the industrial accident should be entirely attributed to the subject industrial
accident. Id. (25:23-25; 26:1-3).

1 Dr. Selznick offered several "hypothetical" ratings for Andrews's various medical conditions during his
deposition. The " ratings" issued by Dr. Selznick were issued for the first time at his post hearing deposition. The
ratings were issued in answer to "hypothetical" questions posed by Claimant's counsel. A motion to strike was made
due to the inappropriate nature o f the ratings. Referee Powers denied the motion holding that the hypothetical ratings
went to credibility of the witness. R. 103.
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Dr. Selznick also testified that Andrews "related to me no issues with his low back, and I
have no reason to disagree with him that he had on average zero of ten pain. IfI recall correctly,
he was doing maintenance on up to 26 buildings, and he was with the church as a long-term
employee for upwards of 20 years .... " Id. (24:9-21).
Dr. Selznick also opined that the right knee was exacerbated and/or aggravated by the
industrial accident. However, he was unable to offer anything other than the timing of the
subjective increase in symptomology and his examination with respect to flexion. Id. (31-33). He
also readily admitted that arthritis is a degenerative disease and that his exan1ination would be
consistent with normal denegation of that condition. Id.

iv.

Delyn Porter Vocational Report

Mr. Porter issued a report in the case below but was not deposed. Mr. Porter's report was
geared towards identifying potential jobs for Andrews. However, the commission ruled against the
ISIF finding that Andrews had proved he was an odd-lot worker. This finding has not been
appealed. As such, Mr. Porter's report is of very limited relevance to this appeal.

C. Proceedings Below.
The hearing before Referee Powers was with respect to ISIF liability only. Appellant's
employer, the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (" LDS Church"),
settled with Appellant prior to hearing.
Briefing was submitted after the closing of evidence by both parties pursuant to the
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Industrial Commission. On May 10, 2016,
referee Powers issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Recommendation, finding
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that Appellant had failed to establish ISIF liability. R. 126. On May 10, 2016 the Industrial
Commission issued an order adopting Referee Powers' recommendation. R. 128.

III.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1) Was there substantial and competent evidence to support Lhe finding that Appellant
failed to establish that his preexisting permanent partial impairments were a subjective
hindrance to employment?
(2) Was there substantial and competent evidence to support the finding that AppelJant
failed to establish that but for his preexisting impairments he would not be totally and
permanently disabled?

IV.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

( 1) The award of attorney fees on appeal.

V.

ARGUMENT

A. SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE WAS RELIED UPON BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND REFEREE POWERS IN FINDING AN
ABSENCE OF A SUBJECTIVE HINDRANCE TO EMPLOYMENT.
In order to establish lSIF liability under LC. § 7-332 a claimant must show: (1) A preexisting impairment, (2) the impairment was manifest, (3) the impairment was a subjective
hindrance to employment, and (4) the impairment combines with the industrial accident in causing
total and permanent disability. Dunmaw v. J.L. Norton Loggin, 118 Idaho 150, 795, P.2d 312
(1990).
Appellant first argues that he has established a subjective hindrance based upon preexisting
impairment. In advancing this argument, Appellant leaves out that the Supreme Court reviews the
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Commission's findings of fact "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Stoddard, 147
Idaho at 190, 207 P.3d at 166. After the factual finding is so viewed, a detennination of whether
substantial and competent evidence, which is defined as "relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion", exists in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's finding. Jensen, 135 Idaho at 410, 18 P.3d at 214.
In large measure, Appellant makes an argument which would necessitate the re-weighing
of the evidence before the Industrial Commission. He points this Court to testimony and expert
reports which he argues should be persuasive and ignores much of the evidence relied upon my
Referee powers.
Referee Powers did, in fact, recognize the hypothetical ratings of Dr. Selznick. See R. 124

,r 64.

Likewise, Referee Powers agrees that the preexisting conditions were manifest. Id.

,r 65.

However, he found that there was no subjective hindrance to employment. Id.
Appellant cites to Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 786 P.2d 557 (1990),
for the proper standard in dete1mining whether a preexisting condition is a subjective hindrance.
However, claimant only cited to a portion of the test and guidance provided by the Court. Archer
held that the proper test was to determine "whether or not the pre-existing condition constituted a
hindrance or obstacle to employment for the particular claimant." Id. at 172, 786 P.2d at 563. In
providing guidance in applying the test the Court stated:
Under this test, evidence of the claimant's attitude toward the pre-existing
condition, the claimant's medical condition before and after the injury or disease
for which compensation is sought, nonmedical factors concerning the claimant,
as well as expert opinions and other evidence concerning the effect of the preexisting condition on the claimant's employability will all be admissible. No
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longer will the result turn merely on the claimant's altitude toward the condition
and expert opinion concerning whether a reasonable employer would consider
Lhe claimant's condition to make ii more likely that any subsequent injury would
make the claimant totally and permanently disabled. The result now will be
determined by the Commission's weighing of the evidence presented on the
question of wheLher or not Lhe pre-existing condition constituted a hindrance
or obstacle to employmenLfor the particular claimant.

Id. (emphasis supplied).
Referee Powers cited to both the testimony of the Appellant and his experts in support of
his finding. He stated, "Claimant's own testimony, bolstered by Dr. Selznick, is fairly clear that
he was doing his job without any physicians-imposed restrictions at the time of his accident of
March 17, 2009." R. 124-125 , 65. He also recognized that certain accommodations may have
been afforded from time to time. Id. However, under the circumstances of this particular claimant,
Referee Powers found that such accommodations were not unusual for a "valued and worthwhile
employee of Employer and his supervisory position." Id.
The records before the Court are filled with substantial and competent evidence which
support Referee Powers finding. Dr. Selznick testified as follows with respect to Appellant's
limitations:
Q. But as far as looking at these restrictions, U1at would be consistent with the
type of surgery that Mr. Andrews was required to have?
A. For my own patients that I've performed lumbosacral fusion on in the past, I
think her restrictions are actually quite generous. I would never even put down
50 pounds with a co-worker. I would be closer to the lower limits in my own
clinical practice, with all honesty, rather than the maximum limits that you
noted.

Q. In any event, these limits or the lower limits you've spoken of that you would
have put into place were the result of the surgery necessitated by the industrial
accident?
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A. More likely than not, yeah. It's a very extensive surgery to have three motion
segments in your low back fused.

Selznick Deposition (28:20-25; 29: 1-11).
Dr. Selznick also testified that Appellant was "grossly asymptomatic" at the
time of the industrial accident and that he could work without restriction.
Q. Take a look at page 16 of that same report [Hearing Exhibit B] 5 for me,
Doctor. And in the second to last paragraph at the bottom in the last sentence,
you indicate that he was grossly asymptomatic for the 18-month period prior to
the subject industrial incident. And what do you mean by "grossly
asymptomatic"?
A. He wasn't receiving active low back directed treatment. He was able to
continue with his vocational and avocational activities without restriction.
That's grossly asymptomatic.

Id. (25:4-13) (emphasis supplied).
Q. And, in fact, in -- on page 16 at the bottom of the first paragraph, you opine
that the surgery and treatment received after the industrial accident should be
attributed in its entirety to the March of2009 industrial accident; is that correct?
A. Correct

Id. (25:23-25; 26:1-3).
Q. And given these representations, Doctor, is -- did he appear to be under any
limitations with respect to his back before the date of this industrial accident?
A. What he related to me was that he was working full time for the Church of
Latter-day Saints up and through subject accident as a maintenance mechanic.
He related to me no issues with his low back, and I have no reason to disagree
with him that he had on average zero of ten pain. If I recall correctly, he was
doing maintenance on up to 26 buildings, and he was with the church as a longterm employee for upwards of 20 years ....

Id. (24:9-21).
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Appellant testified , at the time of hearing, that his left knee was fine at the time of the
subject accident. Hearing Transcript (59: 11-15). He attributed his current problems with is left
knee to arthritis. Id. (59:19-21). He does not attribute his difficulties with this knee to his most
recent back surgery. Id. Likewise, Appellant testified he had not been disqualified for any jobs due
to left knee problems. Id. (62: 11-13). Appellant chose to have his right knee replaced because he
"was still on Church insurance." Id. (58:8-21 ).
All of these statements, among others, provide substantial and competent evidence to
support Referee Powers' findings. When viewing this testimony in a light most favorable to the
ISIF, competent evidence exists to support Referee Powers ' statement that "Claimant testified to
the effect that he was fine before his 2009 accident" and "virtually all of Claimant's curTent
restriction stem from hiss 2009 back and right knee injuries alone." R. at 125165 .
The testimony before the Commission certainly constitutes " relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Jensen, 135 at 410, 18 P. 3d at 2 I 4. In sum,
Referee Powers did precisely what the Archer case directs. He weighed the evidence presented on
the issue and made a determination with respect to thjs particular claimant.
Appellant advocates for the precise result which Archer seeks to avoid. He spends a great
deal of time setting forth statements from Dr. Collins report and testimony from Appellant. This
analysis ignores the statement in Archer that this determination is not to be controlled by claimant's
attitude or expert opinion. Instead a weighing of all the admissible evidence is to be undertaken.
In the case at hand, it is clear that Referee Powers found the testimony of Dr. Selznick and
Appellant to weigh in favor of his determination that no subjective hindrance had been established .
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In sum, Appellant is asking this Court to re-weigh the evidence. Such an approach is not
supported by the standard of review or the evidence produced to the Industrial Commission.
Appellant also argues the Commission was required to accept the aJlegation of a subjective
hindrance because it has "not been contradicted." Appellant 's Opening Brief p. 27. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Dr. Selznick's examination of Appellant contradicts the testimony of
other experts.
Dr. Selznick attempted to opine that the right knee was exacerbated by the industrial
accident. However, he was unable to offer anything other than the timing of the subjective increase
in symptomology and his examination with respect to flexion. Selznick Deposition (31-33). He
also readily admitted that arthritis is a degenerative disease and that his examination would be
consistent with normaJ denegation of that condition. Id.
Dr. Selznick further failed to note in his deposition that the knee was limited in Oexion due
to knee replacement which occurred in 2010. Claimant reported that the stiffness was due to the
artificial knee. Hearing Transcript (59:9-10). Appellant's analysis also ignores Dr. Selznick's
testimony, outlined above, that Appellant had been asymptomatic for some time before his 2009
industrial accident.
Clearly substantial and competent evidence exists to support the finding of the Industrial
Commission. When the facts are viewed in favor of the ISIF it is clear that the findings must be
upheld.2

2

It must be noted that whether or not the physical conditions were a l1indrance to employment is not disposi ti ve of
the case. The Commission also found that there was no combination. As such, upholding the decision below does
not hinge on this point alone.
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B. SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
DID NOT COMBINE WITH PREEXISTING IMPAIRMENTS.
Appellant next takes issues with the Industrial Commission ' s finding that Appellant failed
to establish that but for his pre-existing impairment he would not be totally and permanently
disabled. Appellant argues that " bur for Mr. Anders' pre-existing conditions, the 2009 accident
would not have rendered him totally and pem1anently disabled." Appellant 's Opening Briefp. 32.
This argument ignores testimony provided by Dr. Collins, a vocational expert retained by
Appellant.
Dr. Collins testified as follows:
Q. Now, as a result of the industrial accident, he had a bilateral hemi
laminectomy with nerve root decompression, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. That was at L3-4?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Which has, in part, sciatic nerve which sends pain into your
leg and foot; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And as a result of the restrictions from the back, out of your report,
he was restricted to 35 pounds lifting -- up to 35 pounds, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Sitting one to three hours?
A. Yes.
Q. Standing one to three hours?
A. Yes.
Q. Driving one to three hours?
A. Correct.
Q. Walking one to three hours?
A. Yes.
Q. He had limits on bending, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Stooping?
A. Yes.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 14

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Pushing?
Yes.
Pulling?
Yes.
Twisting?
A. Yes.
Q. Climbing?
A. Yes.
Q . Squatting?
A. Yes.
Q. Kneeling?
A. Yes.
Q. Reaching?
A. Yes.
Q. Grasping?
A. Yes.
Q. Repetitious movements?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. He was not -- he had no balancing - he was to do no
balancing, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. No crawling?
A. Correct.
Q. And he had to have frequent changes of position?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Now, 1 think you have provided in your reports that he was
55 at the time you saw him?
A. I think he was 53.
Q. 53. But he looked much older?
A. Yes.
Q. He was very large?
A. Yes.
Q. He was using a staff?
A. He was.
Q. Okay. He had the long, white beard?
A. Yes.
Q. Long, white hair?
A. Yes.
Q. He was in constant pain?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was taking medications for his back?
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A. Correct.

Q. He was tal<ing Lyrica; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q . And Percocet?
A. Yes.
Q. He had radiating pain to his left foot?
A. Yes.
Q. He needed to nap during the course of the day?
A. Yes.
Q. He had left foot drop?
A. He did.
Q. Okay. He suffers from dyslexia?
A. Yes.
Q. And reading problems?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. With those factors alone, just those factors alone, can you
tell me a job that's available to him in the PocatelJo labor market?
A. Well, the only job that I can think he might be able to do is some
kind of -- not commercial driving job, but some kind of light shuttle
or van or -- but, again, he would have the narcotics to consider.
Q. That's the Percocet and the Lyrica -A. Yes.
Q. -- is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Any other jobs?
A.No

Collins Deposition (38: 19-25; 39-41; 42: 1-13). Clearly, in response to questions related to the
limitations of the industrial accident alone, Dr. Collins agreed no jobs were available to Appellant.
It is also worth noting that Dr. Selznick's testimony with respect to aggravation of Appellant's
right knee is far less concrete than represented.

Q. And his right knee was not hurt in the industrial accident; is that cotTect?
A. The right knee itself was not injured, but in a way, he's an eggshell plaintiff because
he had an arthritic in that knee. That was asymptomatic. And it became symptomatic
after subject accident. The knee with the flexion contracture -- if he had the other knee
to bear some of the stress and force, he'd be fine. But in this case, the records clearly
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show progressive right knee symptomatology.

Q. And the osteoarthritic condition of his right is a progressive disease. It gets worse
over time; correct?

A. Osteoarthritis of the knee can get worse over time objectively, but not always do
patients have increasing pain. And I -- of those 20 patients I saw in the office today,
one is a 92-year-old gentleman who I think you know, and his knees are awful on xray, but he's only now coming in for treatment, and I gave him an injection. But I
ensure you, his x-rays looked pretty bad ten years ago, but he didn't have issues ten
years ago.

Q. I understand that, but at any rate, it is a degenerative condition; correct?
A. Yes.

Selznick Deposition, (32: 17-25), (33: 1-1 6).
Dr. Selznick's medical opinion is revealed to be much less clear than Appellant argues. Not
only does Dr. Selznick testify that he believes there was an aggravation, he admits that predicting
when an arthritic knee will need intervention is very unpredictable. In other words, his testimony
supports the conclusion that degeneration due to the arthritic condition alone could be a cause of
Appellant's right knee trouble. It is also worth noting that Dr. Selznick agrees that the right knee was
asymptomatic at the time of the industrial accident. Dr. Selznick's opinions were, in large measure,
hypothetical and this certainly would have impacted the weight Referee Powers decided to assign to
his testimony.
Appellant also cites to Green v. Green, Opinion No. 48 (April 26, 20 16) in support of his
argument. However, contrary to Appellant's representation, this decision weighs in favor of
upholding the Industrial Commission in this case. In Green this Court looked at "the whole" of the
Commission 's decision to determine if the "but for" test had been properly applied. Green, p. 12.
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Where a claimant's total and permanent disability arises solely from pre-existing conditions, solely
from the industrial accident or disease, from post injury changes in health, or from a combination of
pre-existing and past injury problems, the ISIP is not responsible for any combined effects. See

Garcia v. JR. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 722 P .2d 173 (1989). In the case at hand, Referee Powers
properly applied the test.
In analyzing the "but for" requirement Dr. Collins' testimony was considered and directly
quoted. Specifically, in Paragraph 69 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Referee Powers
correctly states that Dr. Collins testified Appellant's 2009 back injury and resulting restrictions
rendered Appellant totally and permanently disabled. R. 126 ~ 69; Collins Deposition (38: 19-25; 3941 ; 42: 1-1 3).3 In paragraph 16 and 18 the Referee clearly identified testimony relating to Appellant's
condition at the time of tl1e accident. R. 111. Referee Powers also thoroughly considered each
vocational expert. R. 112-1 22. When the ruling below is viewed as a whole, it is clear that Referee
Powers did precisely what Green requires. He did not limit himself to a simple medical inquiry and
considered the opinions and statements of vocational experts and the testimony of Appellant as well.
Here again, ample proof was present in the record for the Industrial Commission to find the
absence of any combination. Again, Appellant asks this Court to ignore evidence which would weigh
against him and view the case below in a light only most favorable to him. This appeal is not a forum
in which Appellant may attempt to retry or have reconsidered the findings below. There is no doubt

3

Appellant also argues that Referee Powers misquotes Dr. Co llins deposition. It appears the quoted phrase does not
appear in Dr. Collins' deposition. However, the testimony is less than clear. A fair interpretation would be that the
pre-existing conditions alone made Appellant unemployable. Regardless, it is a moot point because substantia l and
competent evidence exists with or without paragraph 67 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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that some conflict in the evidence exists. However, all that is necessary for this Court to uphold the
findings of the Industrial Commission is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." Jensen, 134 Idal10 at 410, 18 P.Jd at 2 14. Substantial evidence is "more than
a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Id. at 412, 18 P.3d at 216. The factual findings
clearly support the conclusions of law stated in the opinion below.

VI.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO I.A.R.11.2

A violation of rule 11.2 (formerly 11.1) requires that the signed notice of appeal, petition,
motion, brief or other document " (1) not be well grounded in fact (2) not be warranted by existing
law or not be a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and
(3) to be interposed for an improper purpose." Neihart v. Universal Joint Auto Parts, Inc. , 141 Idaho
801,803, 118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) (citing Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138 Idaho 309, 315, 63 P.3d
435, 441 (2003) (interpreting former rule 11.1 , now 11.2).
Rule I 1.2 provides in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party
has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
Based on the foregoing, the instant appeal is not well grounded in fact. In this case, element
one is satisfied as the Industrial Commission's findings of fact are clearly supported by substantial
and competent evidence. Element two is satisfied because there is no argument made in the briefing
for extensions, modification or reversal of existing law.
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Element three can be inferred, as this appeal is a request to have the Supreme Court reconsider
and re-weigh the factual findings of the commission. In sum, the appeal argues that the Commission
did not focus on the evidence Appellant wanted them to. "On appeal, this Court does not re-weigh the
evidence or consider whether it wou ld have reached a different conclusion from the evidence
presented." Neihart, 141 Idaho at 803, 118 P.3d at 135 (citing Warden v. Idaho Timber Corp., 132
Idaho 454, 457, 974 P.2d 506, 509 (1999)). A request to re-weigh the evidence is not only contrary
to the standard of appeal in a worker's compensation case, it needlessly increases the cost of litigation.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, fees and costs on appeal should be awarded to the
ISIF.
CONCLUSION

The record before the Court clearly establi shes substantial and competent evidence to support
the factual fmdings of the Industrial Conunission and as a result the conclusion of law. Accordingly,
the ISIF respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation adopted by the Industrial Commission on May 12, 2 106.
DA TED this 18th day of October, 2016.
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD,

By ~ ~
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 126 Second Avenue
North, Twin Falls, Idaho, certifies that on the 18111 day of October, 2016, he caused a true and correct
copy of the RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
method(s) indicated below, to the following:
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
(Attorneys for Claimant)

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
F~
Fed. Express
Email/Electronic Copy
reed@cooper-larsen.com
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